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Abstract
Over the last 20 years,acute care hospitals in most OECD have built up costly
overcapacities. From the perspective of economic policy, it is desirable to
know how hospitals of different ownership form respond to changes in de-
mand and are probably best suited to deal with existing overcapacities. This
paper examines ownership-specific differences in the responsiveness to
changes in demand for hospital services in Germany between 1996 and 2006.
With respect to the speed of adaptation to changes in demand,the study finds
for-profit ownership to be superior to public and nonprofit ownership. Fur-
ther, it is shown that declining demand can contribute to the expansion of
for-profits through conversions by mainly publicly owned hospitals.Thus,the
study finds evidence that to some extent the privatization of the hospital sec-
tor may be an adequate answer to reduce excess capacities.
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1.  Introduction 
Over  the  last  20  years  demand  for  acute  care  hospital  services  in  most 
OECD  countries  decreased  faster  than  supply.  As  a  consequence,  costly 
overcapacities have been built up (OECD 2008). Hospital care is tradition-
ally provided by nonprofit, publicly owned and for-profit firms. From the 
perspective of economic policy, it is desirable to know how hospitals of dif-
ferent ownership form respond to changes in demand and are probably best 
suited to deal with existing overcapacities. This paper examines ownership-
specific differences in the responsiveness to changes in demand for acute 
care hospital services in Germany between 1996 and 2006.
 1 The basic model 
identifies the determinants of changes in regional bed capacity from changes 
in  demand  within  communities,  while  controlling  for  unobservable  time-
constant heterogeneity across communities and base line market and popu-
lation characteristics in the year 1996. Further, it decomposes responsive-
ness in demand into four sources of change: Openings, closures, conversions 
and changes in hospitals’ size. The analysis discerns to which extent these 
sources are used as adaptation mechanisms to changes in demand in declin-
ing versus expanding regions.  
This subject has so far received attention solely within the US hospital mar-
ket, for which Hansmann et al. (2003) offers a similar analysis. Hansmann et 
al. (2003) find that a relative sluggishness of public hospitals to exit declining 
markets might have contributed to the built-up of costly excess-capacities. 
Chakravarty et al. (2005) show that for-profit hospitals are fastest to enter 
expanding  markets.  Further,  less  efficient  hospitals  exit  markets  with  a 
higher probability when being privately than publicly owned (Deily et al., 
2000). Thus, these studies confirm that private ownership in general, and 
for-profit ownership specifically, is associated with a higher speed in adapta-
tion to changing market conditions than public ownership.  
In the US, hospitals of all ownership forms responded to decreases in de-
mand by decreasing bed capacities. In Germany, the decrease in demand 
was very unequally felt across ownership types. Public and private nonprofit 
hospitals heavily lost ground, while for-profit hospitals managed to double 
their bed capacity, increasing their market share up to 13 percent until 2006. 
The profound consolidation of the German hospital market as well as the 
                                                           
1 There is a long-standing debate on fundamental differences between hospitals of different 
ownership form on numerous other topics. The literature studying ownership effects on various 
aspects of socio-economic relevance such as effects on competition, costs, profitability, diffu-
sion of technology or quality of care is abundant. For a useful introduction into the topic con-
sult Sloan (2000) and Kessler and McClellan (2002). For a discussion of popular theories of 
ownership types see also Villalonga (2000) and Hansmann (1980, 1987). For a seminal overview 
of the distinguishing features of nonprofit firms see Weisbrod (1988).  Expansion in Markets with Decreasing Demand 
pronounced changes in market shares by ownership form are a solid basis to 
broaden the evidence from the US market in the light of the German ex-
perience.  
The paper also generates empirical insights concerning the impact of key 
hospital market characteristics on market consolidation. For instance, I test 
how market consolidation is driven by past levels of regional bed density, 
competition and the distribution of market shares by hospital type. These 
market characteristics are based on predicted patient flows which are mod-
eled on an exogenous source of variation: travel distances between hospitals 
and patients (Kessler and McClellan 2000). This allows studying an unbiased 
impact of market shares and competition on changes in bed capacity over 
time. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and de-
scribes key stylized facts of the evolution of the German hospital industry. 
Section 3 specifies the model. Results are presented and discussed in section 
4. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Data and Stylized Facts 
The main data source is the German hospital statistic in 1996 and 2006. It 
covers hospital and patient level characteristics from all acute care hospitals 
in Germany.  From this data I have extracted the population of all 16 356 
428 patient admissions to 1817 hospitals in 2006 and 14 921 393 admission to 
2 040 hospitals in 1996 excluding all purely psychiatric, military and day-
/night-specific  hospitals.
2  The  following  hospital  characteristics  have  been 
retrieved: hospital ownership type (public, for-profit,  nonprofit), teaching 
status, bed capacity and the 8-level-code of the community (Gemeinde) of 
the hospitals’ residence.
3 In 2006 there were 12 368 communities in Ger-
many.
4 On patient-level the following variables were recovered: age, sex, 2-
digit-diagnosis 
5, the 8-level-code of the community of the patients’ area of 
residence and hospital of admittance. In the models to follow, the areas of 
residence of patients and hospitals are used to calculate patients’ travel dis-
                                                           
2 Data access was provided via data teleprocessing by the Scientific Data Centre of the 
German Federal States Berlin-Brandenburg. 
3 The data does not contain information about system membership. Thus, mergers are not 
identified. 
4 Due to regional reforms numerous small communities were merged to bigger communities 
in the study period. I have constructed and used a transition matrix based on information from 
the German Statistical Office on changes in community codification to achieve comparability of 
communities in 1996 and 2006. 
5 Data in 1996 (2006) was codified according to the 9
th (10
th) revision of the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD). 
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tances to hospitals. These will be the main predictors of regional market 
shares and levels of competition.  
The second data source comprises population data on the level of communi-
ties from the German Statistical Office, which is used as a proxy for demand 
for  hospital  services.  Applying  the  community  identifier,  the  population 
data and the hospital data are merged. Descriptive statistics are presented in 
the Appendix in Table A1. 
Table 1 shows changes in inpatient days, hospital capacity and capacity utili-
zation over the period 1996-2006. Total inpatient days fell by 19.4 percent, 
strongly driven by a decrease in the average length of stay by 21 percent 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2008). Both public and nonprofit hospitals heavily 
lost ground while for-profits increased the number of inpatient days by 75 
percent. Thus, the overall decrease in market size was very unequally felt 
across ownership types. To some extent this is also mirrored in the change 
of the number of facilities and beds by ownership type. Still, the overall drop 
in inpatient days exceeds the build-down of hospital capacity, such that the 
overall rate of capacity utilization in the industry fell to 75 percent. The 
drop in capacity utilization was experienced by all hospitals irrespective of 
the ownership type.  
It is noteworthy to consider the specific evolution of the East German rela-
tive to the West German  hospital market after German reunification. In 
1990, the differences in the supply of hospital services between East and 
West Germany were huge. For example, capacity utilization was around 73 
percent in East and 87 percent in West Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2008). Moreover, 92.2 percent of the market was controlled by public, 7.0 
percent by nonprofit and only 0.2 percent by for-profit hospitals. After re-
unification a massive influx of public and private capital was used to mod-
ernize and consolidate the East German hospital sector. The progress was 
fast. Already in 1996, capacity utilization in East Germany was close to 80 
percent equalling West German levels (Table 2). Moreover, in 1996 already 
10 percent of the market in terms of beds was controlled by for-profit hospi-
tals, a share larger than in West Germany.  This share more than doubled 
further in the ten coming years nearly exclusively at the expense of public 
hospitals. Between 1996 and 2006, the increase in the market share of for-
profits was also experienced in West Germany, although from a lower start-
ing level as compared to East Germany. Still, the expansion of for-profit 
capacity was driven to 64 percent by increases in capacity in West Germany 
and to 46 percent in East Germany (own calculations not in the tables), be-
cause the West German hospital market is roughly five times bigger than 
the East German hospital market. Evidently, market consolidation and pri-
vatization in both West and East Germany contributed to the growing sig-
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Table 2 
Market shares by ownership type, 1996-2006 
  Market Shares in Beds 
  Total  Public  Nonprofit  For-profit 
1996  100  55.2  37.1  5.7 
2006  100  49.6  36.3  13.1 
Change in %-points of 1996 level  0.0  -5.6  -0.8  6.4 
 
 
Market Shares in Beds in East Germany 
  Total  Public  Nonprofit  For-profit 
1996  100  73.0  17.1  9.9 
2006  100  55.7  17.6  26.7 
Change in %-points of 1996 level  0.0  -17.3  0.5  16.8 
 
 
Market Shares in Beds in West Germany 
  Total  Public  Nonprofit  For-profit 
1996  100  52.8  42.1  5.1 
2006  100  50.2  38.8  11.0 
Change in %-points of 1996 level  0.0  -2.6  -3.3  5.9 
Notes: See notes to Table 1. 
In a historical perspective, the growing share of for-profit orientation in the 
hospital industry just follows a long-term trend. Figure 1 shows changes in 
market shares by ownership type from 1952 to 2006.
6 There is a slow but 
steady decline of the market share of publicly owned hospitals, which is ba-
sically taken over by for-profit hospitals. Thus, interestingly, for-profit hos-
pitals gained shares both in times of market expansion – total bed capacity 
increased  from  1952  to  1975  by  36.7  percent  –  and  in  times  of  market 
shrinkage, which is basically ongoing from then on. 
A general explanation of the early preponderance of public and nonprofit 
hospitals may be the underdevelopment of the hospital market as an indus-
try back in the 1950s. It is a common characteristic of new markets – such as 
telecommunication, transport or education – that in their beginning they are 
in the hands of public and nonprofit investors, because this spreads the high 
investment needs (and the risk of default) over the society. Later, the re-
sponsibility to manage the market is handed over to private firms. In this 
view, the decline of public firms in the hospital sector may be a sign of a de-
veloped and well-functioning market (Sloan 2000). 
 
                                                           
6 Because of a change in the statistical definition of hospitals, there is a break in the compa-
rability of the data in 1990. Up to 1989 the shares are based on the bed capacity from the long-
term rehabilitative and the acute care hospital sector in West-Germany. From 1990 onwards 
bed capacity from the acute care market from East- and West-Germany is included to calculate 
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Figure 1  











A more specific explanation for the declining significance of public hospitals 
during the last 15 years is the growing effort of containment of public ex-
penditures  in  the  hospital  sector.  Chronic  underinvestment  by  public  au-
thorities led to a continued ageing of public facilities, creating a huge need 
for reinvestment (Augurzky et al. 2009). Consequently, the for-profit status 
with its broader access to private capital presents a natural basis for mod-
ernization. Further, before 2004 acute care hospitals in Germany acted un-
der a cost-plus reimbursement system. This changed in 2004 after the intro-
duction of the Prospective Payment System (PPS), creating strong incen-
tives for economic discipline in the hospital sector. Under PPS hospitals get 
a  fixed  payment  for  the  treatment  of  each  patient  in  a  diagnosis-related 
group (DRG), regardless of the actual costs incurred by the care of the pa-
tient. The introduction of the prospective payment system in 2004 increased 
cost saving incentives punishing high-cost hospitals. Augurzky et al. (2009) 
shows that from 2001 onwards the financial standing of the sector has im-
proved. However, due to high costs and low profitability public hospitals 
had a significantly higher probability of default than nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals.  Thus,  economic  defaults  of  public  hospitals  are  nurturing  the 
process of privatization. As an alternative to privatization many public own-
ers have changed the legal status of their hospitals from being part of the 
community’s  balance  sheets  to  independent  limited  liability  corporations 
owned by the community. In 2003, 30% out of 796 publicly owned hospitals 
were run as an independent limited liability corporation; in 2006 this was 
9 10  Christoph Schwierz 
already the case for 51% (Destatis 2008).
7 This may have freed public hospi-
tals from potentially restrictive political concerns and may have enhanced 
their ability to adapt to the economic environment.  
Unlike the US, insurance did not favour the expansion of for-profit hospital 
in the hospital sector. In the US, private insurance schemes often offer pref-
erential treatment schemes in for-profit hospitals, such that market shares 
by ownership type of hospitals may depend on the number of private in-
surees in the population. This is, however, not the case in Germany. There is 
universal obligatory insurance coverage in Germany and nearly 99 percent 
of the population was insured already in 1996. Around 10 percent of the 
population are privately insured, the rest being covered by statutory health 
insurance. All patients irrespective of insurance type have the right to be 
treated in hospitals of all ownership types, except in some few specialized 
private hospitals for private insurees, which are quantitatively not impor-
tant. Most importantly, there are no insurance plans, which favour admis-
sion of patients to hospitals of a specific ownership type. 
 
Table 3 decomposes changes in capacity over the period 1996-2006, by own-
ership type as well as by the sources of change: openings, closures, conver-
sions and changes in bed capacity.
8 The decomposition by the sources of 
change is based on Hansmann’s et al. (2003) method. Consider an example 
using closings of hospitals. A hospital’s capacity in 1996 is defined as its ac-
tual capacity in 1996. If the hospital was closed, its capacity in 2006 is de-
fined by its actual capacity in 2006, i.e. in this case zero. This implies a de-
crease in this hospital’s capacity due to its closing by the number of beds it 
had in 1996. However, if it did not close this implies a zero change in capac-
ity for the hospital in this category. In the case of conversions, bed capacity 
is subtracted from the converting and added to the converted ownership 
type, such that it enters both as a gain and a loss in bed capacity throughout 
1996 to 2006. 
In terms of total contraction in bed capacity, closures played the most im-
portant role, but also downsizing of hospitals was substantial. Public and 
nonprofit hospitals made a similar experience as to the sources of change, 
although nonprofits seem to have decreased bed capacity through downsiz-
ing rather than closing of whole entities. Both ownership types lost heavily 
through conversions, but also  registered some gains.  The main source  of 
expansion of for-profits was the conversion of ownership type. 
 
                                                           
7   The distinctions in legal forms of public hospitals are not available before 2003. 
8   Due to a lack of information on mergers, it is not directly possible to study the effect 
of mergers on changes in bed capacity. Mergers will be, most probably, implicit in conversions.  Expansion in Markets with Decreasing Demand 
Conversions contributed 66 percentage points of the total 90 percent gain in 
for-profit bed capacity. This is to be expected in a market with overall ex-
cess capacities. However, expansion by means of openings of new hospitals 




Changes in hospitals’ bed capacity by ownership type and the sources of 
change, 1996-2006 
    Total  Openings  Closures  Conversions
1  Changes in  
# Beds 
Total 
Gain  74,686  26,958  -  41,048  6,680 
Loss  153,240  -  56,587  51,081  45,572 
Net change  -78,554  26,958  -56,587  -10,033  -38,892 
 
Net change in % 
 of 1996 level  -14.2  4.9  -10.3  -1.8  -7.0 
Public 
Gain  22,872  9,540  -  9,912  3,420 
Loss  91,557  -  36,444  30,947  24,166 
Net change  -68,685  9,540  -36,444  -21,035  -20,746 
 
Net change in % 
 of 1996 level  -22.4  3.1  -11.9  -6.9  -6.8 
Nonprofit 
Gain  11,585  5,783  -  4,402  1,400 
Loss  51,617  -  16,305  15,539  19,773 
Net change  -40,032  5,783  -16,305  -11,137  -18,373 
 
Net change in % 
 of 1996 level  -18.9  2.7  -7.7  -5.3  -8.7 
For-profit 
Gain  40,229  11,635  -  26,734  1,860 
Loss  10,066  -  3,838  4,595  1,633 
Net change  30,163  11,635  -3,838  22,139  227 
 
Net change in % 
of 1996 level  89.9  34.7  -11.4  66.0  0.7 
Notes: FDZ (2008), own calculations; Including all acute care general medical hospitals in Ger-
many excluding purely psychiatric, military and day-/night-specific hospitals; 
1 Net change  in 
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Due to the importance of conversions for the evolution of market shares by 
ownership type, Table 4 presents the number and direction of conversions. 
Around 48 percent of the 145 conversions are aimed at for-profit ownership, 
out of which 85 percent are conversions of public hospitals. Another consid-
erable amount of 32 percent of all conversions is to nonprofit ownership. 
The remaining 20 percent of from for-profit and nonprofit to public owner-
ship. Hansmann et al. (2003) found similar evidence for the US market. 
 
Table 4 
Ownership conversions between 1996 and 2006 
   Ownership form in 2006 
Ownership form in 1996 Public  Nonprofit  For-profit  Total 
Public -  19  59  78 
Nonprofit 20  -  10  30 
For-profit 10  27  -  37 
Total 30  46  69  145 
Notes: FDZ (2008), own calculations. 
3.  Models and estimation methods 
The aim of this study is to identify the impact of changes in demand for hos-
pital  services  on  changes  in  hospital  bed  capacity.  For  the  econometric 
analysis it is desirable to use as much variation in changes in local demand 
for as well as supply of hospital services as possible in order to identify the 
effects as accurately as possible. The community level was the lowest geo-
graphic level for which data was available, such that changes in bed capacity 
are modeled on the community level in this study. To capture unobserved 
heterogeneity, long-difference regressions for the period 1996-2006 are es-
timated. As in fixed-effect models based on a year-to-year panel, a long-
difference  model  eliminates  time-constant  unobservable  variable  bias. 
Moreover, it is intuitive that any effects of changes in demand (as proxied 
by population levels) on changes in bed capacity will materialize only in 
longer  time  periods.  Therefore,  with  regard  to  the  aim  of  this  study  the 
modeling  strategy  of  using  long-difference  equations  seems  preferable  to 
fixed-effects regressions with annual data. 
Local bed capacity in 1996 and 2006 is defined as follows. By assumption 
every community is served by every general medical hospital within a dis-
tance of 50 km from the centre of the community. The distance is meant to 
be nonrestrictive.
  9 Each hospital’s total bed capacity is allocated to a com-
                                                           
9 The average linear travel distance in Germany between patients and hospitals is 23.21 km 
and 90 percent of all patients reach their hospital within a distance of 43.96 km. Expansion in Markets with Decreasing Demand 
munity in inverse proportion to the distance between the hospital and the 
centre of a community.
 10  The distributed beds across communities add up to 
the original capacity of the hospitals, i.e. each bed can be distributed only 
once. For each hospital j this yields a measure of bed capacity serving com-
munity i in 1996 ) ( 1996 , ij C , in 2006 ) ( 2006 , ij C  and the log change in capacity 
) ln( ) ln( ln 1996 , 2006 , ij ij ij C C C - = D . Then, each hospital’s capacity is added 
up to the communities’ capacities into several samples. First, capacities are 
summed  by  ownership  types.    For  instance,  the  for-profit  capacity  of  a 
community is defined as the sum of beds of for-profit hospitals serving a 
community  in  1996  ) ( 1996 ,
FP
i C   and  in  2006  ) ( 1996 ,
FP
i C .  The  capacities  of 
nonprofit and public hospitals are defined analogously. University hospitals 
are excluded from the sample of public hospitals.
 11 Second, subsamples are 
based on the different sources of change, which are openings, closings, con-
versions and changes in bed size as described above. For this purpose each 
hospital’s  capacity  is  decomposed  by  the  sources  of  change.  Then,  each 
community’s capacity is recalculated based on these counterfactual hospital 
capacities.  
The basic model specifies the log change in bed capacity of a community i 
as:
12 
, ln ln ln 1996 , 1996 , 2 1 i i i i i i X M P P C e b b D + F + Q + D + D = D
- +
                 (1) 
where  D denotes changes in value between 2006 and 1996, 
+
i P ln is the log 
change in i’s population if it increased, 0 otherwise; 
-
i P ln  is the log change 
in i’s population if it decreased, 0 otherwise; the vector  i M comprises five 
variables denoting the log of beds per capita, the log of the level of market 
concentration  as  measured  by  the  Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index,  which  is 
defined as the squared market shares in terms of beds of all hospitals serving 
a community, and the shares of for-profit, nonprofit and university hospitals 
                                                           
10 In order not to divide through zero, we assume that each hospital is situated at one kilo-
meter’s distance from the centre of the community it is situated in. 
11 Up to 2006 all university hospitals were publicly owned. University hospitals are financed 
to do research, which made up around 1/5 of their total revenues in 2006 (Statistisches Bunde-
samt 2008). This makes them more independent of market forces than other hospital types. 
Including them within the public hospitals would unfairly downgrade the ability of public hospi-
tals to adapt to changes in demand relatively to the other ownership types. 
12 A simpler model in the form of  i i i i P P C e b b D + D + D = D
- + ln ln ln 2 1  was also estimated, 
but estimation results for the demand variables did not differ significantly from the model as in 
equation (1). Therefore, this model is omitted. 
13 14  Christoph Schwierz 
in 1996; the vector 1996 , i X  denotes the proportion of the male population 
aged 20-39, 40-64, 65-74 and 75 or more in 1996 (male, because morbidity is 
sex specific); i e is the iid error term. The controls for base line market char-
acteristics  1996 , i M   and  population  characteristics 1996 , i X   test  whether  the 
impact of demand on changes in bed capacity is sensitive to these base line 
characteristics.  
In a second model, the impact of demand on changes in bed capacity is al-
lowed to differ by base line bed capacity per capita in 1996 ) ( 1996 , i B . This 
model tests whether changes in bed capacity differ depending on whether 
regional bed capacity was high or low in 1996. For this purpose, interaction 
variables between the demand variables and bed capacity in 1996 are intro-
duced: 
. ~ ~ ~
ln * ln





1996 , 1996 , 1996 , 2
1996 , 1 2 1
i i i i i
i i i i i
X M B P
B P P P C
e g
g b b
D + F + Q + D +
+ D + D + D = D
-
+ - +
                (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated separately for regional changes in total 
bed capacity, as well as by ownership type and the sources of change.  
Ideally, explanatory variables should be exogenous to the dependent vari-
able to identify their true effect on the outcome of interest. Typically, how-
ever, market characteristics such as those in equations (1) and (2) may de-
pend on unobserved characteristics of patients and hospital quality, and can 
therefore be endogenous. As one possible solution, Kessler and McClellan 
(2000) propose an identification strategy which instruments the measures of 
hospital market structure on an exogenous source of variation: travel dis-
tances between hospitals and patients. In short, Kessler and McClellan spec-
ify patient-level hospital choice models and predict the number of patients 
admitted to each hospital based solely on exogenous characteristics of pa-
tients and hospitals. In the models, patients are allowed to choose probabil-
istically all hospitals within a limited distance from their point of residence, 
where the key determinant of their choice is the travel distance to the hospi-
tals. The predicted numbers of patients to each hospital are then used to 
calculate measures of hospital market shares and market concentration in 
each geographic region. The effects of these measures on the dependent 
variable are unbiased, because they do not depend on unobserved patient 
and hospital characteristics, such as hospital quality and differences in the Expansion in Markets with Decreasing Demand 
severity of illness of patients. For a detailed description of the model see 
Kessler and McClellan (2000).
13 
4.  Results 
In the following Tables 5 to 9, the upper part is reserved to display the re-
sults from equation (1), while the lower part displays results from equation 
(2).
14 In Table 5, the impact of demand and base line market and population 
characteristics in 1996 on total changes in bed capacity as well as changes by 
ownership type is presented. The responsiveness of hospitals to increases in 
demand is highest for for-profits (upper part of the table). It is lower but 
equally high for nonprofits and public hospitals. Overall, a one percent in-
crease in demand leads to a 0.27 percent increase in capacity. Interestingly, 
and in contrast to Hansmann’s results, for-profits also tend to expand vehe-
mently in markets with decreasing demand. A one percent decrease in de-
mand is associated with a 1.26 percent increase in for-profit bed capacity. 
The expansion of for-profits is balanced by the decrease of capacity of pub-
lic and nonprofit hospitals in declining markets.  
Further, public hospitals are as fast to reduce capacity in declining markets 
as nonprofit hospitals. Concerning the impact of market characteristics in 
1996 on changes in bed capacity, I find the plausible result that capacity de-
creases were stronger in communities with a formerly high bed density per 
capita. These communities probably already had high levels of excess capac-
ity in the past and felt more pressure to adapt. Further, higher levels of 
market concentration are associated with higher decreases in bed capacity. 
Overall, capacities are increased in regions with a higher market share of 
university hospitals compared to regions with a higher market share of pub-
lic hospitals. The effects are more variegated for variation in market shares 
of other hospital types.  
The lower part of Table 5 presents the results from equation (2), where de-
mand is interacted with base line bed capacity per capita in 1996. Because 
the estimation results of the other market characteristics are very similar to 
those  in  the  upper  part  of  Table  5,  they  are  omitted  from  presentation. 
                                                           
13 In the adaptation of the model to the data used here, I estimate the patient-hospital choice 
models separately for 1996 and 2006 and for different clusters of the communities of the coun-
try, in order to allow for flexible functional forms of the model across regions and over years. 
Maximum travel distances of 50 km to every general hospital are assumed. Clusters used are 
the 97 German regional planning areas, as defined by the German Federal Office for Building 
and Regional Planning. Regional planning areas with a high density of hospitals are subdivided, 
in order to enable the estimation of the patient hospital-choice models. 
14 For the sake of brevity, I omit the presentation of estimation results for the population 
characteristics. Overall, higher shares of the older population are associated with smaller de-
creases in bed capacity. Results are obtainable on request. 
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High-capacity  areas  with  population  increases  record  higher  decreases  in 
bed capacity relative to low capacity areas, as would be expected. Similarly, 
in high-capacity areas with population decreases total bed capacity is re-
duced relatively strongly. This effect is statistically significant for for-profits 
and public hospitals. It reveals that the expansion of for-profits in areas with 
decreasing demand was more prevalent, when past levels of capacity were 
relatively high.  
Table 6 decomposes changes in bed capacity by the sources of change. The 
upper part of the table shows that openings and changes in bed size have 
been  equally  strong  means  to  increase  bed  capacity.  Capacity  reductions 
were to the largest extent driven by closures and the downsizing of hospitals. 
As expected, reductions in total bed capacity were stronger in areas with 
decreases in demand. In the aggregate, conversions did not affect overall 
bed capacity. The lower part of the table discerns that market consolidation 
in high-capacity regions in areas with increasing demand took place through 
downsizing,  whereas  in  areas  with  decreasing  demand  closures  were  of 
stronger importance.  
Tables 7 to 9 present a further decomposition of the changes in bed capacity 
by the sources of change and the ownership types. Table 7 indicates that for 
public hospitals closures and downsizing have been the most effective tools 
of capacity reduction. Moreover, closures had been undertaken to a greater 
extent in areas with decreasing demand. This is also true for conversions, 
while changes in bed size responded on average equally strongly to changes 
in both demand regimes. Furthermore, capacity decreases due to closures, 
conversions and downsizing were stronger in high-capacity areas facing a 
shrinking population than in areas with population increases, as expected 
(lower part of Table 6). Similarly to public hospitals, the main vehicles of 
changes in bed capacity of nonprofit hospitals had been closures and down-
sizing (Table 8). Also, nonprofits reduced capacity foremost in high-capacity 
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1
 22   Christoph Schwierz 
Finally, Table 9 suggests that conversions were the most important source of 
increases in bed capacity of for-profit hospitals. More specifically, conver-
sions have contributed to growth of for-profits more in areas with popula-
tion decreases than in areas with population increases (upper part of the 
table). This growth was to some extent triggered by conversions in high-
capacity areas with decreasing demand (lower part of the table). In contrast 
to this, it was shown that public hospitals decreased capacity in these areas 
via conversions in Table 7. These two findings indicate that conversions of 
public to for-profit status mainly took place in regions with a high-capacity 
and a relative decline in demand. This is not surprising, as it may have been 
particularly difficult for public hospitals to maintain capacity in these areas 
and conversions may have offered a way of restructuring. The second most 
important means of expansion were openings of new hospitals. Openings 
seem to have taken place predominantly in areas with increasing demand, 
while growth is also significant in areas with decreasing demand in the sam-
ple of for-profit hospitals. 
5. Conclusions 
 
The objective of this paper has been to examine the evolution of the Ger-
man hospital industry over the period 1996-2006. More specifically, the fo-
cus  has  been  on  the  magnitude  and  the  sources  of  ownership-specific 
changes in regional bed capacity. The first result of the paper is that for-
profits are most responsive to increases and decreases in demand, as proxied 
by changes in population size. Thus, with respect to the speed of adaptation 
to changes in demand the study finds for-profit ownership to be superior to 
public  and  nonprofit  ownership.  This  result  has  been  formerly  shown  to 
hold within the US hospital market.  
The reasons behind this finding are, at least in the German context, mani-
fold and may in general also hold for other countries. The ease of access to 
new capital to expand existing capacities combined with a lack of public in-
vestments in the hospital sector and the incentives to minimize costs by op-
timizing capacity make for-profit firms in general more apt to fast adapta-
tions to changing market environments.   
The second result of the paper is the growing market share of for-profit 
hospitals. On the one hand, during the period 1996-2006 public and non-
profit hospitals were primarily concerned with a reduction of excess capaci-
ties. They did so by closures, downsizing of existing capacity and – predomi-
nantly in the case of public hospitals - conversions. These had been under-Expansion in Markets with Decreasing Demand 
taken to a greater extent in high-capacity areas with decreasing demand, 
which shows in general a sound functioning of the market dealing with ex-
cess capacities. On the other hand, the main sources of expansion of for-
profits have been conversions of mainly public, and to a lesser extent, non-
profit hospitals to for-profit ownership. To a large extent, these conversions 
have taken place in markets with declining demand.  
This finding is not surprising, as public owners will be most willing to get rid 
of their hospitals in regions with falling demand, the alternative being costly 
subsidies. Moreover, taking over these hospitals may be a relatively easy 
entry option for for-profit owners as compared to the opening of completely 
new hospitals. The latter is often more time consuming or even impossible 
in a heavily regulated market such as the hospital industry.  
 
From the economic policy perspective, it is not obvious whether the expan-
sion of for-profit ownership in a market with an overall decline in demand is 
good or bad. The expansion of for-profits has been shown to relief debt-
ridden public hospitals, to increase the cost-efficiency of the sector and to 
some extent the quality of medical care in the US (Gaynor and Haas-Wilson 
(1999), Cutler and Horwitz (1998)). However, there is some evidence that 
for-profits are less cost efficient and less technically  efficient than public 
hospitals in retrospective payment systems due to long average lengths of 
stay  (Herr  2008).  Moreover,  the  expansion  of  for-profits  may  also  slow 
down the process of reduction of excess capacities and can thus be socially 
wasteful (Wicks, Meyer and Carlyn, 1996). If in the long-term for-profits 
succeed to restructure those hospitals, which they have acquired through 
conversions (or mergers), then efficiency-gains should exceed potential costs 
of slowing down the process of reducing excess-capacities.  
Further research should therefore focus on the long-term welfare implica-
tions of changes in the ownership-structure and market consolidation. Wel-
fare effects largely depend on competition and the quality of medical care. 
These have been already partially dealt with in studies using US hospital 
data, but remain largely unanswered for the European hospital markets.  
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Descriptive statistics of market characteristics on community level, 1996 and 
2006 
    1996  2006 
Variables  Obs.  Mean  St. Dev.  Mean  St. Dev. 
Bed capacity           
     Total  11765  44.68  33.74  40.25  34.23 
     Public  11765  20.38  17.42  17.35  15.22 
     Nonprofit  11765  18.37  16.94  13.32  10.52 
     For-profit  11765  2.40  3.45  6.25  7.43 
     University  11765  3.53  4.21  3.32  4.01 
           
Population  11765  6862.04  7032.24  6875.27  6943.62 
Beds per capita * 1000  11765  7.01  4.09  6.32  4.35 
Market concentration (HHI)  11765  3119.65  2749.48  3038.00  2525.84 
Market shares in beds           
     Public  11765  0.54  0.42  0.43  0.38 
     Nonprofits  11765  0.33  0.21  0.32  0.26 
     For-profits  11765  0.08  0.12  0.19  0.18 
     University  11765  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.08 
Notes: FDZ (2008), own calculations. 
 
25 